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Abstract: This paper re-examines Hayek’s insights into the problem of 
knowledge in markets, and argues that his analysis remains pertinent 
but has serious flaws. His central thesis—that the market price system 
is essential for communicating information and coordinating 
transactions wherever knowledge is dispersed and innovation renders 
the future uncertain—remains a potent explanation for the failures of 
central economic planning. His analysis that aggregate statistics 
necessarily abstract from contextual and tacit knowledge has important 
but widely ignored implications for the contemporary use of statistics in 
financial risk models. The recent financial crisis, however, shows that 
market prices can give very misleading signals for long periods, and it 
represents a key example of ways in which Hayek’s thesis is incomplete. 
In particular, Hayek’s analysis falls short by ignoring the role of 
dominant narratives, analytical monocultures, self-reinforcing emotions, 
feedback loops, information asymmetries and market power in 
distorting the wisdom of prices. 
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This paper re-examines Hayek’s argument for what I call “the wisdom of 
prices”. His thesis, that the market price system has a unique capacity to 
solve the problem of knowledge faced by economic agents, has always 
been provocative and contentious. Initially, this was because it 
challenged the very possibility of the central planning that was a central 
tenet of both socialist thought and policy practice in most western    
war-time economies. On this score, history has been kind to Hayek. But 
his thesis remains contentious today: first, because it throws doubt on 
the knowledge assumptions of the efficient markets and rational 
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expectations hypotheses, and suggests important problems with the  
use of statistics by credit rating agencies and the risk management 
departments of financial institutions; and, secondly, because faith in the 
“wisdom of prices” has been seriously challenged by the misleading 
signals given by prices in financial markets over the last decade or more.  
In his famous paper “The use of knowledge in society”, Hayek 
attempted nothing less than to recast the central problem of economics 
as one of knowledge—of how society can make use of “knowledge which 
is not given to anyone in its totality” (Hayek 1948b [1945], 78). In a 
nutshell, he argued that the problem of economics had been miscast as 
how to achieve the efficient allocation of given factors on the basis of 
given data, with the corollary implication that correct foresight is at 
least theoretically feasible. This had in turn led to the mistaken belief 
that governments with superior aggregate statistics at their disposal 
could plan or intervene successfully to improve economic and social 
outcomes. In fact, Hayek argued, it is only through the unimpaired 
operation of the market and the signalling of the price system that we 
can discover the information about preferences, costs, requirements  
and market opportunities that we need to make good decisions. Such 
knowledge is otherwise often irremediably dispersed, subjective and 
tacit; or it may remain as yet undiscovered by anyone. Hayek invented 
one of the great metaphors of economics to explain the role of the price 
system in solving the problem of knowledge: he described “the price 
system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of 
telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch 
merely the movement of a few pointers”; and he continued: 
 
The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw 
material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps 
a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people 
whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, 
are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; that is, 
they move in the right direction (1948b [1945], 87).  
 
This argument for the wisdom of prices, and for the associated 
“epistemological impossibility” of socialist planning (Gray 1998, 40), is 
Hayek’s greatest achievement; and it is one that was thoroughly 
vindicated by the fate of the Soviet and Comecon systems, which 
manifestly failed to solve economic and social problems by planning in 
the absence of a market price system. As this paper will show, many of 
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Hayek’s arguments for refocusing economics around the problem of 
knowledge and avoiding the misuse of aggregate statistics also remain 
highly pertinent to understanding contemporary failures in standard 
economic analysis and financial risk modelling.  
Despite these crucial insights, however, the 2008 financial crisis 
highlights a need to re-assess Hayek’s thinking and to consider the 
limits of its applicability. The crisis, and the years leading up to it, have 
revealed that the price system, even in a relatively free and liquid set of 
markets, can give profoundly distorted signals over a long period, and 
that market movements can themselves be deeply destabilising. Given 
the central importance of financial markets in the modern economy, and 
their strong association with free-market faith in the wisdom of prices, 
the financial crisis presents a serious challenge to Hayek’s theory. We 
owe it to ourselves, and to Hayek’s memory, to understand why his 
theory of knowledge and the epistemological role of prices has proved 
deficient in relation to modern financial markets despite its earlier 
prescient analysis of why planned economies cannot work. Some of the 
reasons highlighted in this paper for the failure of the price mechanism 
in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis are fairly specific to the operation of 
modern financial markets. But, I shall argue that other reasons 
discussed here represent more general qualifications to the applicability 
or validity of Hayek’s theory. In particular, I shall argue that in 
conditions of uncertainty all markets are prone to being unduly 
influenced by homogenous group narratives that undermine the ability 
of market prices to reflect decentralised cognition in the way Hayek 
envisaged. My broader contention is that a series of lacunae in Hayek’s 
thinking explain his failure to foresee how, in these and certain other 
circumstances, a belief in the wisdom of prices may prove misleading,  
or even self-defeating.  
 
KNOWLEDGE AS THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF ECONOMICS 
When Hayek claimed that the central problem of economics is the 
“division of knowledge” (Hayek 1948a [1937], 50), he was consciously 
aping Adam Smith’s analogous focus—the division of labour. Hayek’s 
dialectical target, though, was the focus in contemporary mainstream 
economics on finding solutions to the problem of optimising among 
given preferences on the basis of given data. This, he argued, “is 
emphatically not the economic problem which society faces” (Hayek 
1948b [1945], 77). The mainstream assumption that key data is 
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“given”—“at the command of everybody”—“disregards the fact that the 
method by which such knowledge can be made as widely available as 
possible is precisely the problem to which we have to find an answer” 
(Hayek 1948b [1945], 81). Hayek did not doubt the value of markets in 
achieving benign coordination, but for him the question was how this is 
achieved when economic agents are each operating with very little 
overall knowledge (Caldwell 2004, 336). Standard economics simply 
assumes away or ignores the central problem of knowledge. As Hayek 
put it:  
 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order 
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the 
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess (1948b [1945], 77). 
 
Hayek’s point here is more profound than the obvious truth that 
crucial information is dispersed across many individuals. Although 
difficult to solve in practice before the computer age, the challenge of 
the dispersion (or even quantity) of information presents few 
insuperable obstacles, in theory, to adequate and centralised knowledge. 
Instead, the main problems of knowledge in economics relate, in 
Hayek’s view, to the fact that the knowledge used by social agents is 
subjective (as well as dispersed) and often also tacit and subject to 
constant change. 
Hayek gave a brilliant dissection of the confused term “given data”—
a term still widely employed in economics. He pointed to an ambiguity 
between data in the sense of “objective real facts, as the observing 
economist is supposed to know them” and data, “in the subjective 
sense, as things known to the persons whose behaviour we try to 
explain” (Hayek 1948a [1937], 39). Hayek was in no doubt that the facts 
that matter in the social sciences are the opinions or “views held by the 
people whose actions we study” (Hayek 2010 [1952], 91). In other words, 
the data of the social sciences are “subjective” in the ontological sense 
that they “deal in the first instance with the phenomena of individual 
minds”—with opinions and perspectives that are necessarily incomplete 
and inconsistent; and it is these very opinions that constitute social 
reality by motivating action (Hayek 2010 [1952], 92, 99f).  
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Hayek was steeped in the Kantian tradition of seeing human 
knowledge as inevitably structured by mental concepts and categories 
that we furnish (Gamble 2006, 119). But we can, I think, discern three 
further steps in his argument that are more or less explicit in his use of 
the slippery term “subjective” in his discussion of knowledge. First, he 
inherited from Menger and others in the Austrian School a subjective 
theory of value, where “value is conferred on resources by the subjective 
preferences of agents and cannot be explained as an inherent property 
of any asset or resource” (Gray 1998, 16). This is important because only 
the individual concerned has full access to the value she places on 
goods or to her assessment of the opportunity cost of investments she 
makes. Secondly, since reality is multifaceted and complex, it cannot be 
grasped with any one central over-arching perspective: our views of the 
world are inescapably incomplete, perspectival and diverse. For Hayek, 
the term “subjective” is not a synonym for “erroneous”. Rather, he sees 
the illusion of objective and complete knowledge as what inevitably 
leads to error (Hayek 2010 [1952], 93). And thirdly, given his 
understanding of the subjective nature of value and the partial and 
perspectival nature of all knowledge, Hayek bought into the post-
Kantian view that it is our particular interpretations and opinions that 
guide behaviour and (in part at least) construct social reality in their 
own image. Such is the stuff of economics. 
The dispersed, subjective and perspectival aspects of knowledge are 
only part of the problem Hayek identifies. Equally important is that 
much of our knowledge is necessarily contextual and tacit—impossible 
to extract from “the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek 
1948b [1945], 80). Tacit knowledge is the localized knowledge of how to 
do things, and it is knowledge that cannot easily be articulated and 
passed on to others in explicit and codified form, nor “processed by a 
committee or by a computer” (Hodgson 1999, 47, 60). Moreover, tacit 
knowledge implies, for Hayek, necessary limits to the reach of theory. 
As Gray (1998, 15) puts it: “theory is for him only the visible tip of the 
vast submerged fund of tacit knowledge, much of which is entirely 
beyond our powers of articulation”. 
Finally, implicit in much of Hayek’s work is an acknowledgement of 
a yet more fundamental aspect of the problem of knowledge facing 
economic actors deciding how to act or invest for the future. Hayek 
viewed the market as a “discovery procedure”, but what actors need to 
discover is not limited to existing localized and tacit knowledge 
BRONK / HAYEK ON THE WISDOM OF PRICES 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 87 
available only to individuals. Buchanan and Vanberg (1994 [1991], 323, 
328) point out that Hayek’s language of discovery is somewhat 
unfortunate in that it might seem misleadingly to imply that the 
future—future alternatives, opportunities, costs, preferences and so 
on—is already “out there”, waiting to be discovered. Instead, they argue 
that the market is a “creative process”, characterized by constant 
innovation and novelty, and that the future does not exist ahead of its 
creation by the transformative power of this innovation and novelty. In 
other words, innovation implies a radical ontological limit to knowledge 
about the future. Shackle (1979, 52f) explained this perfectly, when he 
spoke of our “own original, ungoverned novelties of imagination […] 
injecting, in some respect ex nihilo, the unforeknowable arrangement of 
elements”. The future, that is, cannot be known ex ante because it is still 
to be created by how “we imagine, will and choose it to be” (Bronk 2009, 
219); and this first order uncertainty implied by innovation and our 
imagining of new possibilities is “compounded by uncertainty about the 
second-order creative reactions of others” (Bronk 2011, 9). In several 
passages, Hayek appears to grasp this most corrosive aspect of the 
problem of knowledge. For example, he speaks of much knowledge 
being “by no means ‘in existence’” in ready-made form, adding: “Most of 
it consists in a technique of thought which enables the individual 
engineer to find new solutions rapidly as he is confronted with new 
constellations of circumstances” (Hayek 1997a [1935], 95). 
  
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CENTRAL PLANNING  
AND THE DANGERS OF AGGREGATE STATISTICS 
These limits to knowledge form the core of Hayek’s arguments against 
central planning. For him, the problem goes far beyond the manifest 
difficulties of amassing the required volume of existing dispersed 
information or making the requisite calculations to arrive at an optimal 
outcome, without the help of the market price mechanism. It follows 
from his analysis reviewed above that there are several interlocking 
reasons why successful central planning is impossible, and why even  
the advent of computer processing power could not save command 
economies (Hodgson 1999, 52-54). First, much of the required 
knowledge is tacit and cannot be made readily available in codified form 
to planners. Secondly, it is impossible for the knowledge generation 
capacities of all the divergent and incommensurable perspectives of the 
myriad market players in a complex and multi-faceted world to be 
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replicated by any one perspective or theoretical framework, however 
smart. Thirdly, it is impossible for the planner to know the subjective 
values that people, in all their variety, place on economic goods. But the 
killer fact, as Hayek stresses, is that we live in a world of constant flux. 
Our subjective “tastes change from moment to moment”; and our 
technical possibilities are constantly altering as we innovate and 
“discover” technical improvements in the face of new challenges.           
A centrally planned economy would not only have to allocate existing 
resources efficiently; it would also have to rival the knowledge 
generation and discovery capacities of the decentralised operation of the 
market mechanism. This would be difficult, since it is market 
competition itself that provides most of the incentives to adapt and 
innovate: “profits as an inducement to change cannot be dispensed 
with” (Hayek 1997a [1935], 95f, 108). 
Hayek was singularly unimpressed with Lange’s attempt to counter 
these arguments by suggesting that the state could ape the price 
mechanism by acting the role of the Walrasian auctioneer and setting 
prices centrally by trial and error. Hayek argued that this proposal arose 
from an “excessive preoccupation with problems of the pure theory     
of stationary equilibrium”, and an under-appreciation of the need for 
interminable adjustments to new situations, new needs and new 
opinions. He continued:  
 
With given and constant data such a state of equilibrium could 
indeed be approached by the method of trial and error. But this is 
far from being the situation in the real world, where constant change 
is the rule. Whether and how far anything approaching the desirable 
equilibrium is ever reached depends entirely on the speed with 
which the adjustments can be made (Hayek 1997b [1940], 123). 
 
Perhaps the most topical aspect of Hayek’s criticism of the 
epistemological claims of socialists and central planners relates to their 
heavy use of aggregate statistics. There are two key elements to Hayek’s 
thinking on the misuse of statistics. First, he argued that the “blind 
transfer of the striving for quantitative measurements” from the natural 
sciences to the study of human relations—on the grounds that it is 
somehow more scientific than qualitative analysis—is “probably 
responsible for the worst aberrations and absurdities produced by 
scientism in the social sciences” (Hayek 2010 [1952], 114). Such an 
approach tends to ignore anything not easily measurable, abstracts from 
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differences between subjective assessments, and homogenises frames  
of reference—with a consequent inevitable loss of analytical and 
interpretive texture. It also abstracts from local contextual factors and 
any tacit knowledge that cannot be codified in data, “lumping together 
[…] items which differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars, 
in a way which may be very significant for the specific decision” (Hayek 
1948b [1945], 83). As well as these perils of quantification, Hayek was 
also very wary of aggregate analysis in general and statistical averages 
in particular, arguing that they tend to obscure micro-level dynamics 
and give a misleading impression of greater stability in relationships 
over time than in fact exists.  
This distrust of the knowledge content of aggregate statistics made 
Hayek almost as critical of macroeconomics as a discipline—and 
especially Keynesianism—as he was of central planning (Hayek 1967a 
[1962], 262). Hayek thought that attempts to use models relying on 
aggregate inputs to predict and manage demand in the economy tend to 
assume, as Gray (1998, 88f) puts it, “more in the way of concrete 
knowledge of the real relationships which govern the economy than any 
administrator could conceivably acquire”. It is fair to surmise that Hayek 
would have been equally critical of the modern risk management 
industry and credit rating agencies, had he lived to see them dominate 
financial markets and public policy. The way in which rating agencies 
aggregate information on corporate and national entities operating       
in complex dynamic situations to provide a centralised assessment of 
risk that can replace decentralised market cognition can be seen as 
analogous to the efforts of central planning bureaux that Hayek so 
despised. Similarly, the fact that large banks seek to codify, quantify and 
aggregate the variables they face in an uncertain environment and in a 
myriad of different contexts, and reduce these to summary Value at Risk 
metrics, runs counter to Hayek’s strictures on the dangers of abstracting 
from the localised, tacit and constantly changing knowledge of 
individual agents. The financial crisis has shown that both these 
attempts at aggregating information tend to give an illusion of control, 
while failing to reflect key factors in dynamic situations.  
 
THE WISDOM OF PRICES AND THE MARVEL OF MARKET COORDINATION 
If central agency statisticians cannot solve the problem of knowledge, 
how does the free market either solve it or, alternatively, sidestep the 
need to do so? As Hayek points out, it cannot solve it simply by 
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devolving decisions to individuals with access to their own subjective, 
local and tacit knowledge. There also needs to be a mechanism that 
allows the person on the spot to acquire enough information about the 
requirements, subjective beliefs and expectations of others to be able to 
coordinate her actions with everyone else’s. This is where the wisdom of 
prices comes in: it is prices that “act to co-ordinate the separate actions 
of different people”; and they do so because the price system acts as “a 
mechanism for communicating information”, a role it performs with 
great epistemological economy (Hayek 1948b [1945], 84-86). As Hayek 
wrote:  
 
The most significant fact about this system is the economy of 
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual 
participants need to know in order to be able to take the right 
action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol, only the most 
essential information is passed on and passed on only to those 
concerned (1948b [1945], 86). 
 
In this very special sense then, a kind of knowledge—which can be 
shared in summary form by anyone who needs it—is an emergent 
phenomenon from the continuous process of market interaction. 
Thanks to the information conveyed by prices, individual agents can act 
with the benefit of a type of wisdom that is digestible and yet more 
comprehensive than they alone could otherwise acquire or even 
understand. This wisdom of prices is a product of the myriad of 
coordinated pricing decisions by individuals, where each decision is 
made by individuals combining their own contextual and subjective 
knowledge with the outline messages they glean about the views of 
others as expressed by the prices they in turn are willing to accept       
or pay. In this way, as Vernon Smith (2008, 105) puts it, prices are “both 
the carriers of information and the result of that message exchange”. 
We will come back to some reservations about the knowledge 
content of market prices later in the paper, but at this stage it is worth 
exploring further how Hayek envisages the price system operating. First, 
he argues that prices do more than convey key information about the 
beliefs of others; they also direct our attention “to what is worth finding 
out about market offers” (1978a [1968), 182). That is, price movements 
may grab our attention and alert us to areas that others find of interest 
or concern, prompting further research of our own (Shiller 2005, 171). 
Secondly, it is from prices that we discover the existence of innovative 
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new developments. By way of example, Hayek argues that cost curves 
are not “objectively given facts”. Rather, the cheapest method is 
something “which has to be discovered, and to be discovered anew 
sometimes almost from day to day”; and it is the price system that acts 
to communicate the discovery because new ideas announce themselves 
by innovators competitively undercutting the prices of established 
producers (Hayek 1997b [1940], 130). It is exactly this sort of 
informational role that prices are only able to perform when the market 
is not impaired by government intervention. In The road to serfdom, 
Hayek argues: 
 
Any attempt to control prices or quantities of particular 
commodities deprives competition of its power of bringing about an 
effective co-ordination of individual efforts, because price changes 
then cease to register all the relevant changes in circumstances and 
no longer provide a reliable guide for the individual’s actions (1944, 27). 
 
This analysis has largely been vindicated by the negative experiences 
of those economies that have grossly interfered with the price system by 
using price controls or rationing. But, as we shall see, Hayek mistakenly 
ignored the possibility that there might be endogenous market 
influences that could similarly undermine the wisdom of prices without 
government interference playing a deciding role. 
 
HAYEK’S CHALLENGE TO STANDARD ECONOMICS  
AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
Despite Hayek’s argument for the wisdom of prices and his paean of 
praise for free markets, several aspects of his writings make him a 
distinctly uncomfortable figure for mainstream economists. In the first 
place, Hayek became increasingly critical of the emphasis in economic 
models on a static conception of efficiency, and indeed of the very 
notion of an optimal equilibrium (Hayek 1997b [1940], 123; Gamble 
1996, 69). As Hayek wrote: 
 
Economists usually ascribe the order which competition produces  
as an equilibrium—a somewhat unfortunate term, because such an 
equilibrium presupposes that the facts have already all been 
discovered and competition therefore has ceased (1978a [1968], 184). 
 
Hayek may have argued that prices reflect key information and 
register relevant changes in circumstances, but there is much in his 
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writings to suggest that he would have been dismissive of modern 
variants of the efficient markets hypothesis. As well as downplaying the 
notion of optimal equilibrium, he never argued that prices themselves 
could reflect all relevant information. For Hayek the role of prices was 
to supplement each agent’s particular cognition (and local knowledge) 
with a summary reflection of all the market decisions that others have 
made in the light of their respective particular perspectives and 
circumstances. Hayek would have been equally critical of the rational 
expectations hypothesis and its central assumption that, thanks to the 
competitive elimination of systematic errors, the representative agent 
internalises the correct theory of the economy (Frydman and Goldberg 
2011, 67, 91). There can be no representative agent in the Hayekian 
world of radically decentralised knowledge, diverse perspectives and 
subjective valuations; there can be no single theory that encapsulates 
tacit and contextual knowledge and all the relevant aspects of our 
complex world; and there is no single future optimal equilibrium ‘out 
there’ on which all rational expectations must converge. Instead, the 
future we face has yet to be created by discoveries we may ex ante not 
even know we need. 
In many ways, Hayek’s work prefigures modern complexity theory  
in its epistemological challenge to standard economics. While he lacked 
the sophisticated non-linear mathematics and agent based modelling 
employed by many complexity theorists today; and while he sometimes 
appears to have confused complex in the sense of ‘complicated’ (i.e., a 
large number of variables and aspects) with the more technical sense of 
the dynamic emergence of novel outcomes; there is something very 
radical in Hayek’s conception of the market as a “spontaneous order” or 
“catallaxy” that emerges in an unplanned way from the interaction       
of heterogeneous agents (each endowed with only partial knowledge) 
following abstract rules that determine only general patterns of 
behaviour (Hayek 1967b [1964], 27; Hayek 1967c [1965], 92; Hayek 
1978a [1968], 183). The most challenging element of Hayek’s theory of 
markets as “complex phenomena” is his insistence that their complexity 
renders precise prediction impossible. In contrast to Friedman’s 
insistence that economics should be a positive science, judged by the 
“precision” and “scope” of its falsifiable predictions (Friedman 1994 
[1953], 181), Hayek argued that economists should be content with a 
lower degree of explanation and a lower ‘degree of falsifiability’. And, 
rather than attempt precise predictions, they should engage merely in 
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“explanations of the principle” and “pattern prediction”. In other words, 
they should use a scientific method more like that employed by 
evolutionary biologists than by astro-physicists (Hayek 1967b [1964], 
22-31).  
Once economists renounce the assumption that agents can optimise 
on the basis of given factors and correct foresight (an assumption which 
allows precise prediction); and once they acknowledge that we operate 
in complex and dynamic systems where we can never know “all the 
circumstances which will determine the outcome”; they are forced to 
accept limits to prediction (Hayek 1978b [1974], 24, 27). And with limits 
to prediction come limits to our ability to control outcomes by using 
theory-based knowledge. As Hayek said in his Nobel address, “to entrust 
to science—or to deliberate control according to scientific principles—
more than scientific models can achieve may have deplorable effects” 
(1978b [1974], 30). It is likely that many of today’s market participants, 
faced with the serial failure of economists to predict outcomes with   
any precision, would acknowledge Hayek’s insights on the limits to 
prediction. It is less clear how far they or the body politic have accepted 
the corollary limits to control, and acknowledged the dangers, for 
example, of expecting central banks and governments to engineer a 
smooth glide path to recovery on the basis of economic models. There is 
little doubt that, if alive, Hayek would have laid some of the blame for 
the recent financial crisis on repeated interventions by the Federal 
Reserve to limit asset price corrections from 1998 onwards—the         
so-called “Greenspan put”—which had the unintended consequence of 
fuelling an unsustainable boom in credit; and little doubt, too, that he 
would have been queasy about current quantitative easing policies. 
Hayek acknowledged that market prices alone do not provide market 
agents with all the information they need; and, indeed, he recognised     
a greater role than most modern economists do (outside the 
Institutionalist school) for rules of conduct and institutions as carriers 
of both tacit knowledge and the wisdom generated from the trials and 
errors of the past. Such rules are “the product of a slow process of 
evolution in the course of which much more experience and knowledge 
has been precipitated in them than any one person can fully know” 
(Hayek 1967c [1965], 92). For Hayek, the great error of the modern age 
was to assume that we could do without these evolved rules or 
traditions, and instead use rational (economic) models to engineer a 
better future.  
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MISSING ELEMENTS: THE ROLE OF NARRATIVES AND EMOTIONS 
At this point in the lecture on which this paper is based, I sensed some 
in my audience becoming restive. Surely, they might reasonably have 
objected, it is precisely a Hayekian belief in the wisdom of market prices 
that is responsible for the economic and financial mess in which we 
have found ourselves since 2008. Is it not belief in the epistemic and 
other virtues of an unimpeded market mechanism that led to the thirty-
year experiment with deregulation which has, paradoxically, swept away 
the very traditional rules and institutional repositories of wisdom that 
Hayek valued (Gray 1998, 153-155)? And, when it comes to the credit 
crunch, is it not clear that prices gave grossly misleading signals of 
value for a considerable period and failed to alert relevant actors to the 
problems brewing until too late? It is time, therefore, to examine some 
of the main factors that caused financial market prices to be so 
distorted, and to assess how far these suggest general qualifications    
to Hayek’s theory and link to broader problems in his conception of the 
wisdom of prices. 
For all his “epistemological pessimism” (Gamble 2006, 118), Hayek 
underestimated the degree of radical uncertainty we face and over-
simplified the way we cope with it. As Keynes (1936, 149) argued: “The 
outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of 
knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be 
made”. But even Keynes did not theorise fully about the various causes 
of uncertainty and its crucial link to innovation and new ideas (Bronk 
2009, 215; Dunn 2003, 177). This was left to Shackle, who noted: “What 
does not yet exist cannot now be known. […] [We] cannot claim 
Knowledge, so long as we acknowledge Novelty” (1992 [1972], 3, 26).     
It is precisely because the market is a machine for generating innovation 
and novel ideas that we face deep “ontological uncertainty” (Bronk 2011, 
8f).1 Moreover, this is not a problem of dispersed information but one of 
                                                 
1 Under the umbrella of Keynesian uncertainty, an important distinction can be made 
between “epistemological uncertainty”, where relevant probabilities are in practice 
unknown (because of the difficulty of computing all relevant parameters), and 
“ontological uncertainty”, where probabilities are ex ante logically unknowable 
(because of an indeterminacy at the level of reality implied by innovation and novelty) 
(Bronk 2011, 8-11; Skidelsky 2009, 88). While limited progress can be made in reducing 
epistemological uncertainty, ontological uncertainty presents intractable barriers to 
knowledge: it may be simply impossible to know even the categories or entities that 
will comprise future reality since many of them have yet to be invented (Bronk 2013). 
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“symmetric ignorance” (Skidelsky 2009, 45): the inventor of a novel 
product may know a little more than others about its potential, but even 
he is largely unaware of the implications of its adoption by other 
innovative and resourceful agents.  
When faced with ontological uncertainty, everyone is feeling his way 
forward with little firm indication of what the future will bring. With no 
single correct version of the future out there to anchor expectations, 
and a vast space of possible outcomes, prices reflect not so much our 
decentralised knowledge as the way we imagine or hope the future will 
be: “Valuation is expectation and expectation is imagination”, as Shackle 
(1992 [1972], 8) epigrammatically expressed it. Crucially, these 
imaginings generally take the form of narratives, which provide us with 
scripts that “keep ontological uncertainty at bay” (Lane and Maxfield 
2005, 4). It is the stories we tell ourselves that help us to chart our way 
through the unknown future and interpret the constant flow of new 
information, and that provide us with “rationales to support action” 
(Tuckett 2011, 160). It is stories that “provide parameters for decision-
making […] despite the uncertainty” we face (Beckert 2011, 5), and 
thereby help us decide the prices we are willing to pay. In consequence, 
as Tuckett (2011, 24) shows in his empirical findings, the valuation of 
assets “is inextricably linked with the stories people tell about their 
futures”, and the emotions that attach to these narratives. 
This vital role for imagination and narratives in conditions of 
uncertainty does not in itself invalidate Hayek’s faith in the (relative) 
wisdom of prices. So long as prices are a function of heterogeneous 
perspectives and the multiple imaginings, dreams and narratives of all 
market participants, they may still help us spot emerging patterns 
better than we otherwise could (Bronk 2013). But, as Keynes reminded 
us, in conditions of uncertainty investors normally resort to 
“conventional” methods of valuation, and are affected by “mass 
psychology” and “waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment” 
(Keynes 1936, 152-154). In other words, in conditions of uncertainty, 
prices tend not to reflect the decentralised cognition that Hayek believed 
to be the main epistemic advantage of the price system, but rather 
group emotions and shared conventions or narratives.  
It is a feature of human beings that peer pressure affects the way we 
assess evidence (Cassidy 2009, 188f); and that, because we are social 
animals, we tend to think similarly and to be influenced—however 
independent we believe our outlooks to be—by “a Zeitgeist, a spirit of 
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the times” (Shiller 2005, 157). Each period of history tends to be marked 
by what Foucault called “totalising discourses” or Lyotard “grand 
narratives” (Drolet 2004, 20, 25). And, when faced with the uncertainty 
caused by innovation, we are prone to cope by adopting shared “new era 
stories” that inspire confidence and replace the “stories of the past” 
(Akerlof and Shiller 2009, 55). The resulting homogeneity of narratives 
and beliefs, and related tendency to “groupfeel”, undermines the 
cognitive diversity essential to healthy markets (Tuckett 2011, 19). 
Because any single narrative, model or perspective shines a light only on 
certain aspects of what is going on, reliance on one narrative may 
induce blindness to factors which are unforeseen or ignored by that 
narrative. And whenever we all rely on one perspective—on a single 
dominant narrative, modelling framework or gut instinct—we all tend to 
focus on the same aspects of what is going on and to share the same 
cognitive myopia (Bronk 2011, 14f). When that happens, we can expect 
prices to reflect our collective bias and to become detached from any 
fundamentals that our shared perspective ignores.  
This argument for the cognitive and price distortion effects of 
homogenous new-era stories and group emotions is potentially germane 
to any market where innovation causes widespread uncertainty—the 
information technology sector being a good example. This article, 
though, focuses on the argument’s obvious relevance to explaining why 
market prices proved misleading before the 2008 financial crisis.2 The 
decade leading up to the crisis was characterised by massive financial 
and policy innovation, which led to high levels of ontological uncertainty 
(Bronk 2011, 11). In such conditions, investors duly relied on convention 
and new era stories, which in turn engendered widespread confidence. 
As Power (2007, viii, 74f) argues, financial markets became structured 
by a “world-level grand narrative of risk management”, which fostered 
an illusion of control by confusing radical ontological uncertainty with 
measurable risk; and nearly all players saw it as best practice to use 
Value at Risk models to assess the risks they were running. Indeed, as 
Haldane (2009, 4) notes, the pervasive rhetoric was that we had entered 
a new era of “simultaneously higher return and lower risk” as a result of 
                                                 
2 I am assuming it is accepted that market prices were misleading before the 2008 
market crash: they could only have been a good reflection of fundamentals at both  
pre- and post- crash market levels on an extreme view that the huge price changes 
reflected only random exogenous shocks that could not ex ante have reasonably been 
anticipated or spotted by anyone. 
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“a shift in the technological frontier of risk management”. Such an 
analytical monoculture, combined with an overlapping narrative of 
efficient markets (where prices reflect all available information), caused 
most players to be over-confident and to miss or ignore warning signs 
that in retrospect were obvious. Worse still, the risk modelling 
monoculture (and certain exogenously determined global regulatory 
frameworks) led most players to share similar beliefs; and since beliefs 
structure action, this caused very high correlations in behaviour (Bronk 
2011, 15). Prices responded accordingly and the wisdom of prices was 
hopelessly compromised.  
Hayek would not, I think, have expected this to happen. In part, that 
is because his “intransigent methodological individualism” (Skidelsky 
2006, 95), and his attack on “methodological collectivism”, made him 
unduly wary of explanations at the level of group dynamics or “social 
phenomena” (Hayek 2010 [1952], 117f). Perhaps for this reason,          
his subjective account of knowledge largely ignores the all-important 
inter-subjective or social construction of motivating beliefs. It is true that 
Hayek was well aware that individual cognition is structured by 
language, institutions and abstract rules. But in his analysis these are 
not short or medium-term contingent social factors but the product of a 
long-term process of social evolution that winnows out misleading rules 
and ensures they are superior aids to cognition rather than potentially 
misleading frames (Gamble 1996, 54; Gray 1998, 41, 141).  
There are two weaknesses in Hayek’s evolutionary conception of 
institutions: first, it assumes that the fitness landscape of tomorrow will 
be similar to that of yesterday despite radical innovations in the way   
we operate; and secondly, it ignores the social power of apparent 
confirmation of an ultimately flawed narrative or rule by any medium-
term success it has in creating reality in its own image. In other words, 
we should not assume that group narratives that will ultimately prove 
misleading are selected out by competitive markets, since future 
challenges to the validity of a narrative or theory may be different from 
those of the past or present; and, over the medium-term horizon on 
which we operate, there is a strong tendency for belief in a narrative 
(that may in the long-run be flawed) to be reinforced by the impact on 
market prices of many players adopting that narrative. Let us consider 
such endogenous mechanisms for self-reinforcing error further. 
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FINANCIAL MARKET MECHANISMS FOR  
SELF-REINFORCING COGNITIVE HOMOGENEITY AND ERROR  
In conditions of uncertainty, markets become “markets in stories”—
markets in competing interpretative narratives (Tuckett 2011, 159). 
There are always several plausible narratives about the future yet to be 
created by innovative agents, and the outcome of this competition        
in interpretive narratives is indeterminate and partly a function of 
intentional strategy and rhetoric. Competing narratives are also needed 
to help make sense of the movement of prices, since prices themselves 
usually require interpretation before they can be used to make 
decisions. This ambiguity in the meaning of prices is partly due to their 
being at best only an economical symbol of existing tacit and 
decentralised knowledge and judgements;3 and partly because prices 
reflect the shifting group narratives with which we interpret our 
uncertain future predicament. Traders often ask, for example, what a 
move in the oil price means, and look for a narrative that makes sense 
of unusual movements. When they have found one they like, and acted 
accordingly, a self-reinforcing dynamic may take hold if the traders then 
try to convince others to adopt their preferred narrative, in order to 
validate their market decisions and investments. Policy-makers are 
another intentional source of shared narratives, as they seek to guide 
our expectations. Holmes (2009, 385f) argues, for example, that a key 
part of a central bank’s armoury is the use of persuasive and “skilfully 
composed narratives” that “serve as an analytical bridge to the near 
future” and align expectations with an inflation or growth target. This 
strategic use of narratives is often very effective because, at least to 
some extent, the narratives and models we use are “performative”—that 
is, they succeed in shaping reality in their own image by structuring the 
beliefs that motivate action. As Beckert (2011, 8) puts it: “If a sufficient 
number of investors believe in the fictional depiction it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy”. 
This performative attribute of narratives or models may, however, 
create an additional problem of knowledge, for market participants and 
                                                 
3 Hayek saw the very economy of the information provided by prices as a virtue; but    
it is also a weakness. Prices abstract from nuances of interpretation, giving only           
a headline reading of the supply and demand that is generated in the light of 
decentralized knowledge and social narratives. As Westbrook (2004, 51) puts it 
provocatively: “Money is structurally incapable of transferring much information, as a 
language composed of a single word would be”. Holmes (2009, 410) argues that, 
consequently, we need to supply narratives that identify “what the act of pricing 
discards or suppresses”. 
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economist alike. To the extent that (for social, strategic or rhetorical 
reasons) a narrative becomes dominant and governs the beliefs and 
therefore the actions of most agents, prices respond accordingly; and 
this price response may (if sufficiently in line with the narrative) 
reinforce confidence in the veracity of the narrative, with a further 
knock-on impact on prices—an example of what Soros (2010, 14) calls 
“reflexive feedback loops”. But such reflexive lock-in happens despite 
the fact that most narratives or models have weaknesses and miss some 
aspects of what is taking place. The difficulty is that we cannot know   
ex ante whether the apparent short or medium-term confirmation of a 
narrative by price movements reflects genuine fulfilment of the 
narrative’s script or instead masks underlying problems with the 
narrative that have yet to become apparent. This new problem of 
knowledge caused by the performativity of dominant narratives would 
be easier to solve if most market practitioners retained access to the 
“generative friction” of using “multiple evaluative principles” and so 
remained receptive to anomalies that challenged their preferred 
narrative or interpretation of events (Stark 2009, 16f). But it is exactly 
this cognitive diversity and receptiveness that is compromised when a 
market as a whole is governed by an analytical monoculture—whether 
this monoculture is caused by a general conviction that there is one best 
practice (Bronk 2011, 17) or by a particular market narrative becoming 
dominant thanks to reflexive reinforcement by corroborating medium-
term price movements. 
Several social and technical features of markets can help reinforce 
such homogeneity of belief and increase the dangers of self-reinforcing 
error. First, as Akerlof and Shiller (2009, 56) argue, stories and the 
emotions of confidence and pessimism that attach to them spread “like 
viruses”; and, indeed, their transmission can best be modelled with the 
techniques of epidemiology. Market panic (or confidence) and associated 
narratives are self-reinforcing; and their spread (like that of epidemics) 
is unpredictable and given to sudden threshold effects. Secondly, 
Beunza and Stark (2012, 383-413) show that some traders have 
developed “reflexive modelling” that infers the views of other traders 
from the prices they pay in order to use these inferred views “as inputs 
to their own decision-making”. Beunza and Stark argue that this 
technique may aid “distributed cognition” and the “interplay of internal 
and external estimates” so long as the opinions and perspectives so 
inferred are heterogeneous, but that the same technique may lead to a 
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dangerous form of “cognitive interdependence” and serve to reconfirm 
error if most players initially share the same faulty analytical frame.     
A third factor—in this case exogenously determined by regulators—is 
the increasingly widespread international use of “mark to market 
accounting”, which requires that changes in prices be immediately 
reflected in balance sheet values. This leads to the danger of a “loss-
spiral” if banks are forced to off-load other assets to make up for any 
loss before they would otherwise have needed to (Cassidy 2009, 309f). 
Such self-reinforcing price movements can be very destabilising. Even if 
the initial price signal is valid, there is a danger that, as a result of a 
shared accounting convention, correlations in the reactions to this price 
movement are unnecessarily high, and prices move far beyond the level 
that fundamentals would otherwise imply. 
Another dynamic in financial markets that can lead to self-
reinforcing errors was first articulated by Keynes (1936, 156) in his 
analogy of financial markets to a beauty contest where the prize goes to 
whoever correctly anticipates “what average opinion expects the average 
opinion to be”. In part, this dynamic is caused by the fact that, when the 
future is uncertain, there is an incentive for an investor to second-guess 
the opinions of others, not for their imputed informational value, but 
because opinions are reflected in prices with the result that short or 
medium-term market movements can be predicted (and a fortune made) 
by correctly anticipating the trend of average opinion. It is also, as 
Keynes (1936, 157f) wrote, because it is usually safer in career terms   to 
be successful in such short-term momentum trades, or else to “fail 
conventionally”, than to risk an unconventional approach. For, an 
unconventional approach often implies short-term losses and may not 
be profitable for the investor before doubting clients or employers have 
terminated her career. 
Orléan (2012, 316f, 331) takes Keynes’s argument a stage further, 
arguing that a financial market acts as a cognitive machine for 
producing “a reference opinion”—“an expression of ‘what the market 
thinks’”; and that this market opinion is a by-product of the self-
referential process identified by Keynes, which renders agents 
“extremely attentive to the way in which the collective opinion is 
formed”, that is, to salient models and dominant narratives. Here then  
is a self-reinforcing market mechanism that drives the serial emergence 
of widely held market opinions or market-wide conventions. When this 
happens, I would argue, Hayek’s reasons for favouring the price system 
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as a generator of knowledge are threatened: market practitioners may 
no longer rely primarily on their diverse independent perspectives and 
interpretations of events or prices but may instead continually second-
guess, and then rely exclusively on, emerging average opinion about 
what prices signal and the future holds—average opinion which may 
turn out to be misguided in the long run.  
What is particularly paradoxical for Hayek’s theory is that market 
practitioners often behave in this way, not merely to anticipate market 
moves speculatively, but because they have internalised a simplified 
version of Hayek’s own message about the wisdom of prices. Largely 
under the auxiliary influence of the (non-Hayekian) efficient markets 
hypothesis that prices reflect all available information, a generalised 
belief in the wisdom of prices has become divorced from Hayek’s 
insistence on each agent complementing the message from prices with 
his own (decentralised) cognition and local knowledge. In other words, 
while Hayek’s central argument was that the price system is necessary 
for wisdom, market participants have come to believe the stronger claim 
that the information gleaned from prices is sufficient for wisdom—a 
view Hayek never shared. When they adopt this stronger claim, market 
actors believe it is rational to economise on their own analysis and 
follow the judgement of the herd as expressed in market prices, on the 
assumption that market prices give correct signals; and such an 
unqualified belief in market opinion may eventually cause persistent 
mispricing.  
This perverse dynamic is similar to the phenomenon known as an 
“information cascade”, where people with limited knowledge follow the 
decisions of others rather than make independent judgements, on the 
frequently false assumption that the herd is likely to be right, and 
consequently end up converging on bad outcomes (Cassidy 2009, 189-
191; Surowiecki 2004, 53f). A generalised belief in the wisdom of prices 
may be self-defeating if it encourages market participants to substitute 
emergent market opinion for their own independent judgments and to 
free ride on the wisdom of others as reflected in prices. When that 
happens, the price system no longer reflects the cognitive diversity and 
localised knowledge of all market agents, and instead it becomes an 
unstable product of reflexive interaction and social learning. Nor is this 
only a phenomenon in financial markets. Widespread belief that the 
wisdom of prices is sufficient (like widespread belief in the “wisdom of 
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crowds”4) may encourage in any market a tendency that at group level  
is self-defeating—a tendency for individuals to assume they can 
economise on their own localised knowledge and cognitive effort, 
thereby depriving the price system of much of its informational input. 
 
MARKET POWER, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY,  
EXTERNALITIES AND THE QUALITY OF PRICES 
Most of the mechanisms for entrenching cognitive homogeneity and 
self-reinforcing error considered above are particularly damaging to the 
wisdom of prices in the conditions of ontological uncertainty that are 
especially (though not exclusively) associated with rampant financial 
market innovation. There are, though, other factors that frequently 
impinge on the validity of Hayek’s argument for the epistemic value of 
the price system even in more stable environments and in non-financial 
markets.  
The first is the distortion implied by gross inequalities of wealth  
and market power. Hayek’s assumption that key implications of 
decentralised knowledge and the full variety of subjective assessments 
are reflected in market prices (and that this is the main reason for the 
superiority of markets over central planning) ignores the problems 
implied by such inequalities. The degree of influence that any player has 
on market prices is a function of their market power and wealth; and 
this means that if those who possess some key decentralised knowledge 
have very little wealth or market power, and are outbid by those 
ignorant of the facts, the true picture may not be well reflected in  
prices. It is usually large players that, regardless of the superiority (or 
otherwise) of their knowledge, control the market prices on which 
others base their strategy. Market success often goes to the wealthy 
rather than the wise. Of course, inequalities in wealth and market power 
compromise more than the epistemic role of the price mechanism: they 
also compromise its moral claim to reflect the various subjective 
preferences and valuations of all market participants. Hayek argued that 
an advantage of the market mechanism is that, unlike central planning, 
                                                 
4 Surowiecki’s argument (2004) for the “wisdom of crowds” resembles Hayek’s for the 
wisdom of prices. Surowiecki argues that crowd decisions are wise when they 
aggregate a diverse set of decentralised and independent judgements. But Surowiecki 
(2004, 43f) also points out that generalised belief in the wisdom of crowds can be   
self-defeating: “[If] the group usually knows best (as I’ve argued it often does), then 
following the group is a sensible strategy. The catch is that if too many people adopt 
that strategy, it stops being sensible and the group stops being smart”. 
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it does not impose a single scale of values but instead reflects the full 
variety of preferences found in a free society (Hayek 1997b [1940], 138). 
But if wealth or market power is too concentrated then market prices 
largely reflect the subjective preferences of the rich.  
Another equally serious lacuna in Hayek’s thinking is his minimal 
recognition of the damage done to the wisdom of prices by market 
failures. These failures include the problem of externalities—the fact, for 
example, that the full social costs of pollution, congestion or resource 
depletion are rarely reflected in the prices that individual firms or 
consumers face in the market. They also include the problem of 
information asymmetries where one party to an exchange has an 
information advantage over the other. In such circumstances, as is    
well articulated in modern information economics, there may be 
opportunistic behaviour by the advantaged party. The fear of this alone 
is enough, in the absence of trust, to cause “thin” markets and the 
mispricing of deals (Akerlof 1970); and there is little doubt this problem 
played a part in the recent distortion of price signals in financial 
markets (Cassidy 2009, 164f). Crucially, though, the very tacit and 
contextual knowledge that Hayek believed to be an important reason  
for favouring the decentralised cognition of market pricing implies 
information asymmetries; and these asymmetries in turn imply that 
tacit knowledge is likely to be associated with thin markets 
characterised by distrust, mispricing and low liquidity. Hayek never,       
I believe, recognised this problem with his theory. In practice, any sector 
where tacit knowledge is key to the valuation of products (for example, 
the specialised mechanical engineering sector in Germany) needs non-
market coordination mechanisms that allow relevant parties to share 
tacit knowledge and build trust (Bronk 2009, 162f).  
A related problem with Hayek’s theory concerns the pricing of    
non-standard products. Non-standard products are for Hayek a prime 
example of where tacit and contextual knowledge is key. But modern 
theory suggests that in these cases we do not have the level of liquidity 
and repeat transactions that allow prices to gain acceptance as fair 
public indicators of information. MacKenzie (2012, 336f, 345), for 
example, notes that in financial markets prices typically provide good 
information that most market participants are willing to trust only 
where there are standardised products, highly liquid markets, and 
continuous trading. Mackenzie argues that, additionally, there must be 
few concerns (arising from opportunism) about the “quality” of prices—
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their “fairness”. This implies an important general qualification to 
Hayek’s theory: in the case of non-standard product areas and especially 
one-off transactions (where tacit and contextual knowledge and 
information asymmetries are often crucial) there is unlikely to be 
widespread faith in the fairness of posted prices. In these cases, prices 
are likely to be agreed upon only by parties who share crucial 
information through non-market mechanisms, and then the price 
mechanism itself is not a primary source of the knowledge required to 
transact. Furthermore, when prices for non-standard transactions are 
agreed in this way, they may never be made publicly available in a form 
that third parties can learn from.  
 
CONCLUSION 
As a critique of attempts to aggregate information centrally with 
statistics, Hayek’s analysis of the problems of knowledge remains 
peerless. His championing of the feats of coordination enabled by the 
market price mechanism also remains convincing in explaining why in 
most markets we rarely experience widespread gluts or shortages of 
products, and why we largely succeed in catering for an astonishing 
variety of subjective preferences. Such coordination makes use of 
knowledge that is never available centrally and it does so through the 
signals given by prices.  
It is important, however, to recognise that, particularly in the 
conditions of uncertainty caused by widespread innovation (where no 
strong anchor for expectations exists), prices may be seriously 
misleading. In these conditions, market participants tend to gravitate to 
group narratives to help make sense of their predicament, with the 
result that prices tend to reflect a narrow range of partial perspectives 
rather than the fully decentralised and diversified cognition that Hayek 
correctly saw as key to the wisdom of prices. There are several 
mechanisms endogenous to financial markets that particularly      
favour the epistemologically dangerous emergence of homogenous 
frames of reference, widespread conventional opinions and analytical 
monocultures—notably feedback loops between economic (or modelling) 
narratives and prices. Paradoxically, another threat to the wisdom of 
prices is that widespread belief in the wisdom of prices can become  
self-defeating if it causes market participants (contrary to Hayek’s 
advice) to economise on their own decentralised cognition and free-ride 
on the wisdom of others, thereby depriving the price system of some   
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of its informational input. And, finally, Hayek’s followers need to 
acknowledge the serious damage done to the knowledge-generating 
properties of market prices whenever markets are characterised by large 
inequalities of wealth, externalities or information asymmetries. 
Like most great theories in the history of ideas, Hayek’s theory of 
the wisdom of prices may be as interesting for the reasons we now want 
to qualify its applicability as for its continued insights in other areas. 
For, when we understand better the sources of weakness in the 
epistemic role of the price system, we may have a better chance of 
avoiding the conditions that generate widespread distortion of market 
prices. In particular, the argument advanced in this paper suggests     
the importance of safeguarding the cognitive diversity of market 
participants by minimising as far as possible endogenous market 
pressures for analytical monocultures and homogeneity of belief. It also 
suggests that great care is needed in weighing up the advantages of 
regulatory harmonisation against the disadvantages for the operation of 
the price mechanism of this exogenous source of cognitive 
homogeneity. But consideration of this regulatory trade-off is another 
story for another paper. 
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